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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 890606-CA

v.
JACKY BOBO,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from one second degree and one third
degree felony conviction.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant

to UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953) (Cum. Supp. 1989) and
77-35-26(2)(a) (1953) (Cum. Supp. 1989).

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a conviction and final judgment
entered against appellant in the Second Judicial District Court
in and for Davis County, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, presiding,
Appellant was convicted of one count of Possession of A Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953,
as amended), and one

count of Unlawful Possession of Cocaine

Without Tax Stamps Affixed, a third degree felony, in violation
of UTAH CODE ANN. §59-19-106 (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 6, 1988, the State charged appellant by
information in Counts I and II with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended), both second degree
felonies.

Count III charged appellant with possession of a

controlled substance, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §58-378(2)(a)(i) (1953, as amended), a Class B misdemeanor.

In Counts

IV and V, respectively, appellant was charged with unlawful
possession of cocaine and psilocybin without tax stamps affixed,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §59-19-106 (1953, as amended),
both third degree felonies.

On August 11, 1989, appellant filed

a Motion to Suppress and a Memorandum of Law in support thereof.
On August 15, 1989, the trial court found probable cause for the
searches and seizures, and denied appellant's motion to suppress.
(R. 77)
Appellant then entered a conditional guilty plea in the
district court to Counts I and IV (R. 29), reserving his right to
appeal his arrest and the subsequent search of his apartment as
violative of the state and federal constitutions.

(R. 69)

The

other counts were dismissed upon the motion of the County
Attorney.
Based on the conditional guilty plea to Counts I and IV,
the court sentenced appellant to one to fifteen years in prison
on the second degree felony and zero to five years on the third
degree felony, with both commitments to run concurrently with
each other.

The court, however, stayed the execution of the
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sentence and placed appellant on probation (R. 82), and ordered
him to serve six months in jail. The court then issued a certificate of probable cause and allowed appellant to post bail
pending this appeal.
Appellant requests this court to reverse the trial court's
ruling on his motion to suppress (R. 77), which ruling determined
that appellant voluntarily consented to the search of his apartment.

State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1989).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did appellant, who was told by a peace officer that the
County Attorney was in the process of preparing a search warrant,
voluntarily consent to the search of his apartment without coercion or duress, as required by the Constitution of the State of
Utah and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution?

APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
- 3 -

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person or life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 14
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be secured,
and the person or thing to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 6, 1988, officers from the Layton City Police
Department were called to a disturbance at the residence of the
appellant (R.18, Preliminary Hearing transcript, hereinafter
"Tr." at 1-2). Upon arrival, officer Kevin Allred and a companion officer observed a loud party going on (Tr.2).

The

officers knocked on the door and appellant answered (Tr.2).

The

officers indicated to him that they had a report of a loud party
involving juveniles (Tr.2).

Appellant then opened the door and

invited the officers inside to observe that there were no
- 4 -

juveniles nor was there a loud party (Tr.2).

Upon entering, the

officers observed several individuals and a pipe that smelled
like marijuana (Tr.2).
The pipe was seized and appellant was placed under arrest
(Tr.3).

A search of his person resulted in the discovery of a

small bottle containing a white substance that appeared to be
cocaine (Tr.3).

Appellant was handcuffed and secured on a sofa

in the living room (Tr.3).

The officers requested that he

consent to a search of the apartment (Tr.3).

Appellant did not

reply to the request (Tr.3).
The officers then contacted a deputy county attorney to
request that a warrant be prepared (Tr.3).

Narcotics detectives

were also summoned and subsequently arrived at the scene (Tr.4).
Detective David Nance of the Davis County Metro Narcotics arrived
at the residence (Tr.4).

Detective Nance told appellant that the

officers were in the process of preparing a search warrant and if
appellant would consent to the search of the apartment, that
would speed up the process (Tr.15).

Appellant, indicating that

he was in a hurry to get it over with, agreed to allow the
officers to search the residence (Tr.16).

During the course of

the search, a bag of psilocybin mushrooms was found as was a bag
of cocaine (Tr.16).

- 5 -

The state charged appellant in five counts with the
possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute,
possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of
controlled substances without tax stamps affixed (R.7).

Appel-

lant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession
of controlled substance with intent to distribute and one count
of unlawful possession of cocaine without tax stamps affixed
(R.29), reserving his right to appeal the underlying arrest and
search of his apartment (R.69).
On October 10, 1989, the District Court granted
appellant's conditional guilty plea, on the ground "that there
are meritorious issues in [this] case that should be decided by
the Utah Court of Appeals" (R.69).
appellant's motion to suppress.

The court, however, denied

The court held that appellant

voluntarily consented to the search which resulted in the discovery of the evidence (R.78).

The court, therefore, sentenced

Cf. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), holding that
a narcotic defendant could appeal denial of his motion to
suppress following his no-contest plea, which was explicitly
conditioned on his preservation of his right to appeal the
suppression issue if the lower court denied his motion and to
withdraw the plea if the appellate court finds for him. The
court noted with approval that other jurisdictions have found
equally proper the acceptance of conditional guilty plea agreed
to by the parties and the court. See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 388
So.2d 584 (La. 1976) and People v. Reid, 362 N.W.2d 655 (Mich.
1984).
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appellant to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of
1-15 years on the conviction of possession off a controlled
substance with intent to distribute and 0-5 years on the conviction of unlawful possession of cocaine without tax stamps
affixed.

The sentences were ordered to run concurrent (R.30).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court requires that a citizen voluntarily
consent to the search of his person and things before the constitutionality of a warrantless search may be established.

The

trial court in the instant case improperly found that appellant
voluntarily consented to the search of his apartment.

Because

the officer intimated that the County Attorney was in the process
of drafting a search warranty appellant's consent was coercively
or deceptively obtained and hence involuntary.

Even if the

officer had claimed that a magistrate, as opposed to a county
attorney, a non-neutral state agent, was in the process of preparing a search warrant, such statement, if untrue, would be
violative of the constitutional prohibition against consent
obtained by coercion or duress.

This court should, therefore,

find appellant's consent to the search involuntary because it was
obtained by deceit and coercion.

- 7 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS APARTMENT AND THAT THE OFFICERS ACTED WITHIN THE "CONSENT EXCEPTION" TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
requires that a police officer obtain a search warrant before
searching a citizen, his house and his effects.

United States v.

Ventressca. 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).
There is,

however, a limited exception to this warrant require-

ment.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the
Supreme Court examined the "consent exception" to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

In that case, the Court

noted that one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment is a
search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent.

The question

dealt with was what must the prosecution prove to demonstrate
that a consent was "voluntarily" given.
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that
"voluntariness" required for a consent to search should be the
same as the voluntariness showing required in a police
- 8 -

interrogation.

The Court stated that any coercion, explicit or

implicit, would negate a voluntary consent.

Further, the

Government need not show that the person had been specifically
warned of his right to refuse a consent search.

In doing so, the

Court also rejected the defendant's claim that the consent to
search was like a waiver of a constitutional right at a criminal
trial.

The Court held that a knowing and intelligent waiver, as

in the waiver of counsel at trial, was not required.

It stated

that the test to be applied is the traditional test of voluntariness.

Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proof to show that

the consent was freely and voluntarily given and was not the
result of duress or coercion.

Voluntariness, it was held, is a

question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.
Id.
The Court then discussed some of the factors to be
considered when applying this totality of the circumstances
test.

Those include:

the defendant's intelligence, whether or

not the defendant was in custody, the nature of the police questioning and the environment in which it took place, the defendant's knowledge of his right to withhold consent, and any other
circumstances that weigh on the issue of voluntariness.
In the instant case, appellant was in police custody,
having been arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia
- 9 -

(Tr.10).

He had been subjected to intense questioning by the

officers (Tr.12).

Several officers at various times asked appel-

lant to consent to the search (Tr.12).

Without knowledge that he

could withhold his consent, appellant at one point told the
officers that he had not said they could not search (Tr.12).
Moreover, the officers told appellant that they were in the
process of preparing a search warrant.

Appellant, like any

reasonable man, could and did conclude that the officers in a
matter of time would show up with the constitutionally required
warrant.

In addition, there were elements of intimidation and

coercion under the circumstances of this case.

Because appellant

refused on several occasions to consent to the search (Tr.12),
the officers "took turns" in pressuring him to submission.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
search in the instant case, the trial court erred in concluding
that appellant voluntarily consented to the search (R.78).
The issue of coercion as it relates to a consent to search
has also been addressed by the Supreme Court in other contexts.
The primary issues raised in United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1980), were whether
airport authorities had illegally stopped the defendant and if
she then voluntarily consented to accompany agents to an office.
The Court found that the authorities acted properly in stopping
- 10 -

and asking the defendant for identification.

The Court went on

to find that the defendant had consented to go to the office of
the Drug Enforcement Administration.

The officers had not kept

the defendant's airline ticket or identification.

The Court

found that the officers' actions could give the defendant the
impression that she did not have to accompany them.
Conversely, in Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct.
1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), it was held that a stop of an individual on less than probable cause cannot justify a detention in
a small room by two police officers.

The officers had retained

the defendant's airline ticket and identification.

They then had

his luggage brought to the room where he was held.

The Court

found that such a situation would result in the defendant's
belief that he was under arrest.

Because the defendant had not

been informed that he was free to board his plane and he actually
believed he was being detained, it was held that the encounter
had lost its consensual nature.

The Court went on to hold that,

as a practical matter, Royer was under arrest.

Since there was

no probable cause to arrest him, the search was illegal. Thus,
the evidence was ordered suppressed.

The Court then made some

observations about the nature of searches based on consent:
where the validity of a search rests on consent,
the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely
- 11 -

and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of
lawful authority. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a
similar issue in United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th
Cir. 1985).

In that case, the defendant had been stopped for

speeding in New Mexico.

He produced a Virginia driver's license.

The car was not registered to the defendant.

The officer ran an

NCIC check to determine if the vehicle had been reported as
stolen.

That check was negative.

He then requested assistance

from a backup officer stating that he had a "gut instinct" that
the defendant was transporting narcotics.

The officer returned

to the defendant's car and told Recalde he could either plead not
guilty or sign the ticket.

When it was signed, the officer asked

the defendant to step out of the car and then asked for permission to inspect the trunk.

During the inspection, the officer

found that some of the screws in the molding had been tampered
with.

The officer then requested that the defendant accompany

him to a nearby town, which the defendant agreed to do.

At no

time had the officer returned the defendant's driver's license,
the vehicle registration, or the traffic ticket.

At the police

station the defendant consented to the search of the car.
In analyzing the issue of whether the trip was made with
the defendant's consent, the Tenth Circuit employed a three tier
analysis described as follows:
- 12 -

First, there must be clear and positive testimony
that the consent was unequivocal and specific.
Second, the Government must establish that the
consent was given without duress or coercion.
Finally, we evaluate those first two standards with
the traditional indulgence of the courts against a
presumption of waiver of constitutional rights.
761 F.2d at 1453.
In determining the issue of duress or coercion in
obtaining consent to search, the Utah Supreme Court has described
a number of factors that should be considered.

In State v.

Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Ut. 1980), the court stated,
Clearly the prosecution has the burden of establishing from the totality of the circumstances that
the consent was voluntary given; however, the
prosecution is not required to prove that defendant
knew of his right to refuse to consent in order to
show voluntariness. Factors which may show a lack
of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence of
a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2)
the absence of an exhibition of force by the
officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the
absence of deception or trick on the part of the
officer. [Footnote omitted]
621 P.2d at 106.
Several other cases from the Utah Court have held that the
question regarding a Fourth Amendment violation turns on the
2
issue of reasonableness . Under that test, courts are to balance
2

State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Ut. 1978); State v. Kelsey, 532
P.2d 1001 (Ut. 1975); State v. Kaae. 30 Ut.2d 73, 513 P.2d 435
(Ut. 1973).
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the interests of society against that of the individual.
However, in State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Ut. 1981), three of
the justices expressly rejected this standard as it failed to
comport with the requirements of the United States Supreme
Court's rulings on the Fourth Amendment.

The majority of the

court adopted the standard that searches not made pursuant to a
valid warrant were per se unreasonable and subject to the well
delineated exceptions.

That standard comports with those

outlined in Bustamonte, supra, and Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968).
In Bumper v. North Carolina, the defendant was convicted
of rape.

The defendant was a black male who lived with his

The court would typically describe this test as follows,
In regard to the propriety of the search: it
is to be had in mind that the constitutional
protections are only against unreasonable
searches. The test to be applied is whether
under all of the circumstances, fair-minded
persons, giving due consideration to the
rights and interest of the public, as well as
to those of the suspect, would judge the
search to be unreasonable intrusion into the
latterfs
rights.
A further
important
observation is that the just-stated test to
gauge the validity of a search without a
warrant is satisfied if consent is given to
the search, as was done here; and that these
rules apply even when the suspect is in
custody.
[Footnotes omitted]
State v.
White, supra, at 553-554.
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elderly grandmother in rural North Carolina.

White officers went

to the home, told the grandmother that they had a search warrant,
and requested to search the home.
go ahead and search.

The grandmother told them to

At the hearing on the motion to suppress

the State neither relied upon nor produced a search warrant.

The

Court noted that the State has the burden of showing that the
consent was freely and voluntarily given.

Furthermore, the

Court stated that this burden could not be discharged by a
showing of acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.

Id. at

548-49.
The Court then held that a search conducted pursuant to a
warrant cannot be justified by consent if the warrant is later
found to be invalid.

The Court went on to state:

When a law enforcement officer claims authority to
search a home under a warrant, he announces in
effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search. The situation is instinct with coercion —
albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is
coercion there cannot be consent.
391 U.S. at 550.
The evidence in this case did not show that the detective
indicated that he did, in fact, have a warrant.

However, the

evidence clearly showed that the detective implied that it would
only be a matter of time before a warrant would be produced
(Tr.15).

The detective intimated to appellant that the "County

- 15 -

Attorney was in the process of preparing a search warrant"
(Tr.15).

He, however, did not explain to appellant the proper

procedures for obtaining a warrant.

Nor did he inform appellant

that he need not give his consent to the search.

Under such

circumstances, the detective's statements amount to a claim of
lawful authority to search pursuant to a warrant, even though he
did not have such authority.

Under the Bumpers rule, the consent

was not voluntarily given.
Similarly, a notable commentator in the area of searches
and seizures observed that:
A mere threat by the police to obtain a warrant if
consent is withheld is not sufficient to constitute coercion because the police are only informing
the individual of a course of action they are
entitled to take. Some courts have distinguished
between statements by the police that a person
"might as well consent" because a warrant could
easily be obtained, and statements that the police
would "attempt" to obtain a warrant or could "probably" obtain one. While the former type of statement implies that a warrant will issue as a matter
of course, the latter more accurately reflects the
necessity that a neutral magistrate pass upon the
probable cause for a search before a warrant
issues.
Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions, Clark
Boardman Co., Ltd. 1989, pp. 9-14.
The officer's statement in the instant case falls into the
category of statements "imply[ing] that a warrant will issue as a
matter of course."

Id.

The officer not only threatened to
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obtain a search warrant but implied that one was being drafted.
On direct examination, officer Nance said "[he] explained to
[appellant] that the County Attorney was in the process of preparing a search warrant • . ." (Tr.15).

That statement indicates

that the County Attorney was authorized to issue a search
warrant.

The statement did not advise appellant that only an

independent and detached magistrate could issue a search
warrant, based on probable cause.
(Utah 1983).
Bumpers.

State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715

The instant case, therefore, somewhat resembles

The officer's statement which induced appellant's

consent had elements of coercion and deception, which the Supreme
Court has found invalid to support a claim of voluntary consent
to search.

Bumpers, supra: Bustamonte, supra.

Thus, this court

should find that defendant's consent to the search of his
apartment was involuntary.
POINT II
APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO THE SEARCH
OF HIS APARTMENT AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION
14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
In State v. Nielson, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986) and State v.
Rice, 717 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986), a majority of the Supreme Court
of Utah concluded that Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution
of Utah may be interpreted to provide broader protections than
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the Fourth Amendment.

Although this would not be the result of
4
any textual differences between the two provisions, a state
court may interpret its own constitution independent of the
federal decisions and such decisions would not be subject to
federal review or reversal.

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032

(1983).
Thus, with respect to the consent issue, under a purely
state law analysis, the courts should require that officers
inform defendants that they have the right to refuse to allow the
search of their person or property.

Likewise, if a defendant is

truly free to terminate an encounter with a police officer, the
state courts should require defendants to be so informed before a
voluntary consent may be established.

In other words, the State

courts should adopt a knowing and intentional standard for waiver
of search and seizure rights.
Such rulings, based solely on the State Constitution could
alleviate a number of confusing areas related to the law of
search and seizure.

It would simplify the job of law enforce-

ment, in that officers would not need to be concerned with the
somewhat confusing rulings from the federal courts.

They would

merely have to follow the stricter state requirements.
4
Both provisions share nearly identical language.
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Secondly,

such positions would preclude interference and confusion of state
legal issues by the federal courts.

In a concurring opinion in

State v. Johnson , 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987), Justice Zimmerman
described the confusion in the federal search and seizure case
law.

In doing so he quoted from an opinion he authored earlier

in State v. Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985).

He stated:

. . . much of the existing federal fourth
amendment warrantless search and seizure law
is rather Kafkaesque, consisting as it does
of rules built upon a series of contradictory
and confusing rationalizations and distinctions. Police officers and judges attempting
to make their way through this labyrinth
often imperil both the rights of individuals
and the integrity and effectiveness of law
enforcement. [711 P.2d at 271-72]
745 P.2d at 456.

The rulings that are suggested here could avoid

these problems.
Applying the standard set forth above to the instant case,
appellant's purported consent to the search of his apartment
does not measure

up to Utah Constitutional requirements in

Article I, Section 14. That section should be interpreted as
requiring a peace officer to inform a suspect that he

has a

constitutional right to withhold consent to a search of his
person or effects.

Because appellant's consent was unknowing and

a result of deceit and coercionr this court should reverse the
trial court's conclusion that appellant voluntarily consented to
the search of his apartment.
- 19 -

CONCLUSION
Appellant's agreement to allow the detectives to search
his residence was not voluntarily given as required by the Constitution of the Stte of Utah and the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The evidence,

including the mushrooms and cocaine, that was seized after the
search based on the involuntary consent should have been ordered
suppressed.

The trial court erred in finding that appellant's

consent was voluntarily made.

This court should reverse the

trial court by holding that the consent did not meet constitutional standard.
DATED this

H

day of December, 1989.

- 20 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this t4vi^ day of December, 1989,
I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief to the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114.
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE .OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S

Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

JACKIE EUGENE BOBO,

Criminal No. 6346

Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress, having come on
regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court, and
counsel having stipulated that the matter be submitted based upon
the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and the memorandum
submitted by counsel and the Court having reviewed the transcript
and the memorandum submitted, and being fully advised in the
premises, rules as follows:
The defendant at the time of the search was under
arrest in his own home by officers who had probable cause to be
there.

He was asked if they could search his residence, and he

did not respond.

The officers proceeded to contact the County

Attorney's Office for a warrant to search and the defendant was
informed that they were doing that.
There was no force exhibited, and no threats were made
to the defendant.

A subsequent request for search was made, and

the defendant responded that Mhe never said they couldn't, and
that they could go ahead and search-.

The defendant was

imo

cooperative.

No tricks were employed by the law enforcement

officers, when they said they were attempting to get a warrant,
they were in the process of getting a warrant from the county
attorney•
Looking at the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the consent to search, the Court concludes that
defendant's consent was voluntarily given, and therefore, the
defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.
DATED this

)S*K day of August, A.D., 1989.
BY THE COURT:

)isxrict Court Judge
Dis
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Ruling on the

day of August, 1989, postage

prepaid to the following:
Ron Yengich
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
William McGuire
Davis County Attorney's Office
Courthouse Building
Farmington, UT
84025

Deputy Clerk

